(1) UB = U B(X,, X.) , (2) (i = 1, 2, . . , ... ., n-) where X' represents party A's share of good i. Good j is the numeraire. Equations (1) and (2) establish a consumption interdependency, for good n enters simultaneously into the utility functions of both parties. Following Samuelson (1954) , good n can be defined as a collective-consumption good or a public good, for X" = XA = XB, while Xi's are private goods and X, = X4 + XP. Using the convention of writing the partial derivative of any function with respect to its ith argument by an i subscript so that We assume that all factors of production are inelastically supplied and privately owned by individuals and that there exists competition in production. Diagrammatically, the functional relationships shown in equations (1), (2), and (3) can be represented as figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. As shown in figures 1 and 2, we shall be explicitly concerned throughout with the case where both parties regard Xn as a "good" (that is, the reader is asked to adjust the analysis himself should he be interested indicate, respectively, A's and B's generalized purchasing powers or "incomes" in terms of the numeraire good. The sum of Ao Da and B0 Db makes up the total income of the two parties combined and equals AB in figure 3. Since X. = XA = XB, each diagram is lined up with exactly the same horizontal scale. The three diagrams are thus interrelated, and obviously the interrelationships of the three will be much clearer if they are integrated into one diagram. This is done in the following procedure: First, we rotate the horizontal axis (Xn axis) of figure 2 around its origin, Bo, so that the rotated axis, denoted as B0 X*, has the same slope, in absolute terms, as the production-possibility curve of figure 3 at each output level of X, with respect to the B., Xn axis. We then redraw each indifference contour for B as a broken line by measuring the quantities of Xj and Xn required for B to remain at the same utility index by the vertical distance from the rotated axis (B0 X*) and by the horizontal distance from the vertical axis (B0 Xj), respectively. This operation produces a new set of broken-line contours, which are now called adjusted indifference curves for B, as shown in figure 2. Clearly, the map of the adjusted indifference curves conveys exactly the same information as the original map of indifference curves, the only dif-6 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY ference being that the slope of an adjusted indifference curve at any point with respect to B0 X,, axis is now (-nU /Uz
+ fxnlfxi
The second step is that we flip up and over the map of B's adjusted indifference curves around the horizontal line crossing point DJb, or "money" income of B, Db F, by 180 degrees and fit it on the top of the A's indifference map so that the A0Xj axis of figure 1 and the B, Xj axis of figure 2 become the same axis (A, XJ) and point Db coincides with point Da, which indicates "money" income of A. This simple twostep transformation produces a right-angle triangle, as shown in figure 4, congruent to the production-possibility block of figure 3. It is immediately apparent that the triangle diagram thus produced in figure 4 not only shows the production-possibility relationship but also possesses essentially the same characteristics as those of the familiar EdgeworthBowley box diagram. In fact, it is so similar in nature that a brief explanation will perhaps suffice for our needs.4
In figure 4 , AB on the vertical axis shows the endowment of the group as a whole measured, of course, in terms of the numeraire commodity or the sum of the initial "incomes" of parties A and B, with D being the distribution point of the sum between them. While BC is the group's production-possibility curve, the horizontal line DF is party B's production-possibility curve when B's initial endowment alone is available for production of X". Therefore, DF may be called party B's independently attainable consumption-possibility frontier. Similarly, party A's production-possibility curve, and hence its independently attainable consumption-possibility frontier, is drawn as a line parallel to BC from D toward A Xn axis as shown by line DE. Any combination of public and private goods that falls between these two frontiers is not obtainable by either parity independently. Both parties must jointly finance the costs of Xn. For example, to reach a combination of Xn, X4, and X8, represented by point J, A and B must bear taxes corresponding to JK and LJ of the numeraire good, respectively. Their respective indifference curves containing point J indicate their welfare levels thus attainable jointly.
I Figure 4 was developed independently in the context of a public good. However, it came to my attention later that in the context of external diseconomy Dolbear (1967) reached a similar diagram by a somewhat different method. But, in my view, Dolbear's "fold-in" and "stretch" method is not entirely without ambiguity, particularly when the transformation line is nonlinear, whereas the method presented here has the advantage of being applicable to any forms of transformation curves without ambiguity, as will be seen in Section III. 
Equation (6) is the well-known Pareto-optimum condition for a public good specified by Samuelson (1954) in his theory of public expenditure, and equation (5) , that provides an ethical evaluation of the well-beings of different parties is required; and (3) so long as the contract curve does not happen to be a vertical straight line, the economic-efficiency problem (namely, how much of a public good it is efficient to produce) and the ethical problem (namely, how in justice the costs of public expenditure are to be distributed between the parties) cannot be logically separated; indeed, as is clearly shown in figure 4, choosing a point on the contract curve amounts to resolving these two problems simultaneously. Undoubtedly, recognition of the existence of a solution that is Pareto preferred to the initial position, which is usually in a discussion of public goods a position such as D, where the public good in question is absent, must be the basis of the so-called voluntary-exchange theory of public finance. Lindahl (1919) observed, for example, that "the sum of the contributions which the various parties may be prepared to make towards the realization of the more important collective goods far exceeds the matters' total cost" (p. 168). This means to say in our figure 4 that, to realize a quantity-say AG-of good n, the maximum contributions which party A and party B will be prepared to make if necessary are IK and LH, respectively, and their sum far exceeds the total cost necessary to produce that quantity (AG) of the public good, that is LK (=NB).
But it is at once clear from our diagram that the situation at hand is essentially one of indeterminate bilateral monopoly. We cannot expect that each party will voluntarily contribute toward the collective-consumption good unless it is otherwise precluded from enjoyment of the public good by some exclusion devices. Each party, in the hope of moving along the opponent's indifference curve constituting the outer edge of the area of Pareto-preferred solutions (DHZ or DI Y), will most likely engage in a game-theoretic strategy.
Economists customarily have had very little to say about pure bargaining situations in which the outcome is dependent upon interactions among only a few parties. Except for a few models based an strong institutional assumptions, we have had to fall back on Edgeworth's model of bilateral monopoly, in which only a "trading area" is delimited with no further restrictions of the outcome. Within the trading area, the solution is said to depend upon the "bargaining abilities" of the parties. Unsatisfactory though it may be, a democratic determination of public expenditure squarely falls into this category of situations. The most we can do is to identify a set of possible solutions or the trading area. The trading area is delimited in our diagram generally as the area demarcated by two indifference curves, each of which is the highest indifference curve that each party can attain independently from the starting point in question.6 Such an indifference curve is, as a rule, the one tangent to the respective party's independently attainable consumption-possibility frontier. 
Thus the quantity of XB, which simultaneously enters utility functions of more than one party (two parties in this case), is assumed to be controlled and produced only by one party (in this case party B), called the acting party, on the assumption that it is the controller of the good which imposes an externality on the other. Clearly, the basic characteristic of this externality relationship is identical to that of a public good expressed by equations (1) and (2); and it is not difficult to see that the necessary condition for Pareto optimality for this case is identical to that of a public good shown by equation (5) or equation (6).
If there are any features that distinguish an externality relationship from a public-good case, they are the assumed institutional and/or technological conditions including the structure of property rights that motivate and/or constrain the behavior of the parties involved. In the externality case, for example, it is usually assumed, but often implicitly, that for institutional and/or technological reasons the parties involved cannot or will not enter into effective bargaining regarding the provision of XB, and, therefore, the party controlling the good or activity creating the externality (party B) reaches its own equilibrium position in isolation. With the acting party, namely, party B, having reached its private equilibrium, we shall then have the following situation at that private equilibrium position which is often referred to as the status quo situation: fB/f%. it involves indeterminacy of the status quo position similar to that of a public good insofar as X4 and XB are substitutes. Indeed, in the extreme case, namely, where they are perfect substitutes-that is, each party does not distinguish its own consumption of X,, from the indirect consumption of the other-marginal reciprocal externalities of the separable kind are reduced to public goods. Or alternatively, a public good could be defined as the limiting case of the separable reciprocal externality. For separable and nonseparable externalities, see Davis and Whinston (1962) . PUBLIC EXPENDITUIRE 13 solution; but, as figure 4 shows, the number of Pareto-preferred solutions is infinite, and so is that of Pareto-preferred Pareto optima. Each party striving to obtain a solution as close as possible to the opponent's indifference curve constituting the outer edge of the Pareto-preferred solution area will most likely refuse to make the vote on any particular solution unanimous unless the vote is an all-or-none offer, which is clearly not the voting procedure that Wicksell was proposing. The difficulty will be intensified rather than removed as the number of parties involved is increased for, with respect to any proposed solution, almost all parties except the one proposing it would find some alternatives preferable, and be prepared to propose their own alternatives, and try to get them passed by voting down the proposed.10
In fact, the unanimous-voting approach appears to make the problem of determining a single solution in a situation like a bilateral monopoly even less tractable than the direct-bargaining approach. It is generally argued in the literature on bilateral monopoly that, to discover a possible equilibrium position, the modes of behavior of the parties involved must be known in addition to their objectives, and the equilibrium position will depend upon the "bargaining abilities" of the parties. In this respect, Lindahl (1919) , who apparently sensed the indeterminacy of the Wicksellian approach and attempted to solve the problem by introducing the concept of the equal bargaining power as an additional determinant and assuming-albeit implicitly-specific behavioral patterns for the two parties involved, thus appears to have been more in line with the modern approach to the duopoly problem.
Lindahl's solution is a Pareto-optimum point on the contract curve. It is defined in our diagram as the intersection of the locus of points of tangency between party A's indifference curves and various rays extended from point D and the locus of points of tangency between the same rays and party B's adjusted indifference curves. The slope of such a ray indicates a distribution ratio of the tax bill between the two parties, and, of course, the point of tangency between the ray and one of the indifference curves of one party indicates the optimum combination of the public and private goods that that party would choose if it had to a' The time constraint or impatience, namely, a high opportunity cost involved in remaining at the status quo position, costs of administering voting, and other technical antl institutional constraints may make a particular vote effectively an all-or-none offer for all parties concerned. In such a case, a solution located within the trading area would secure unanimity. But if there are no such external pressures and tabling counterproposals is always permitted, as advocated by Wicksell (1896, p. 92), there will be little chance of any specific proposals being accepted by a unnanimoils vote. Moreover, yielding to the Wicksellian qualified majority is not only often insufficient to secure a decision but also self-defeating for the very idea of the qualified majority must imply "interpersonal utility comparison," which Wicksell was apparently striving to avoid. (Another difficulty of the Wicksellian approach will be discussed in Section III.) 14 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY bear the tax share represented by that ray. In figure 5, reproduced from figure 4, the loci of such tangency points (analogous to the lines commonly known as price-consumption curves and to be called hereinafter the pseudo offer curves) are denoted by DRa and DSb for parties A and B, respectively, and their intersection point by P. Pseudo offer curves DRa and DSb and point P correspond to curves RA and SB and point P, respectively, of Lindahl's figure 1 (1919, p. 170) .1 Since at the point of intersection of DRa and DSb, both party A's and party B's (adjusted) indifference curves are tangent to the same ray, they must have the same slope. Therefore, point P, the intersection point, must be on the contract curve. Clearly, Lindahl's solution is the equivalent of the perfectly competitive market solution of private goods, which can similarly be represented as the point of intersection of the two offer curves in an Edgeworth-Bowley Box Diagram.
It is well known, however, that the offer curves will be revealed only when each party acts as a price taker or considers that its own price, that is, tax-share ratio in this case, is uncontrollable by its own action. However, different from the perfectly competitive market of private goods, in the case of a public good each party is perfectly well aware of its influence on its own price. The offer curves for a public good will thus never be revealed. (Therefore, the names of pseudo offer curves.) But they perform a useful function to elucidate the similarities and differences in the market mechanism between the public and private goods. Figure 5 shows that, should the pseudo offer curves have ever been revealed or should all taxpayers have acted as the price taker, a central coordinating agency would find by, say, a process analogous to the Walrasian tdtonnement, an equilibrium quantity of Xn, represented by such a point as P. Point P may be called, therefore, the pseudo laissez faire solution corresponding to the given distributions of ownership of factors of production, implicit in the income-distribution pattern indicated by point D. All that the servant of the ethical observer had to do to swing the economy to his master's grand social optimum would be, exactly as in the case of a competitive private-goods market, to shift the starting point of the pseudo offer curves, D, along the vertical axis by varying the initial distribution of generalized purchasing power, namely, the initial X4 and X%, by a lump-sum tax and transfer, that is, Samuelson's Li (1954, p. 388), until the intersection point of the pseudo offer curves would land on the attainable-bliss point on the contract curve.12 The conception of this pseudo competitive market solution seems to be the genesis of the Wicksellian separation of the government function into two parts: one to establish a proper (or just) initial state of income (or property) distribution and the other to determine efficient size of public expenditure and allocation of its tax bill through the voluntary contribution.'3 Obviously, however, the whole rationale of the separation and the voluntary-solution arguments will collapse if the pseudo laissez faire solution is unattainable spontaneously.
Lindahl understood well that to trace an equilibrating process of his model he cannot use an assumption that both parties act as price takers or quantity adjusters as would be the case under the perfect competition. His description of the adjustment process clearly indicates (albeit 12 In the case of the private goods only, in order to swing the economy to the attainable-bliss point on the contract curve, the same operation must be carried out in an Edgeworth-Bowley Box Diagram, the only difference being that the offer curves of this ease are actual and not pseudo. Thus, with respect to the need for redistribultion to attain the social optimum, there are no differences between the market of private goods only and that involving public goods in spite of Musgrave's (1959, p. 58) statement seemingly implying the opposite. 13 However, there is no guarantee, as is clear from our figure 5 and pointed out by Myrdal (1930; henceforth my references to English translation), that if the income distribution before tax (represented by D) is equitable, the postfiscal action welfare distribution voluntarily achieved by the pseudo competitive market mechanism (represented by P) will be also equitable. In fact, to obtain the equitable postfiscal action distribution, the income distribution before tax per se may more often than not have to be made "inequitable." implicitly) that he has employed the so-called leadership and followership approach usually attributed to von Stackelberg, namely, one party acts as a price maker and the other as a quantity adjuster. Under this assumption, the price maker fixes the price so that his welfare is maximized, taking into account the fact that the other party will only select points lying on its offer curve. Then the tax-bill distribution ratio that the price maker, say, party A, chooses will be that corresponding to the point at which his indifference curve is tangential to the other party's pseudo-offer curve (DSb). This point is given by Q in figure 5 only efficient solution and that it was comparable to the solution of a perfectly competitive private-goods market; and he apparently wanted to conjure a situation which would lead his system to this particular solution. This was perhaps his undoing. To break the indeterminacy of his model, he introduced the notion of equal bargaining power as an additional determinant to his system. This was sought as an improvement of his approach over the Wicksellian approach, but instead it sent his argument into a circular reasoning. He defined, in effect, the equality in bargaining power as the power relationship that would lead the parties concerned to this particular equilibrium position represented by point P. Clearly this was tautological. True, there might be a certain combination of bargaining power of the parties which precisely leads them to the solution at P, but, unless the bargaining power is defined independently of that consequence and measured somehow in an objective way, the equal bargaining power is an empty concept. To be sure, bargaining between protagonists with equal bargaining power measured in terms of some objective scales, assumed to exist, will lead the parties on to the solution represented by some point in the trading area, but it will be an accident if such a point coincides with point P. Nor is there any assurance that his assumption of "just initial distribution of property" necessarily leads to this solution.16 Lindahl's rigid adherence to the behavioral assumption that each party reacts always along its pseudo demand curve and his willingness to dodge the real issue by the tautology of the equal bargaining power seem to be the main weaknesses of his otherwise pioneering work.
Musgrave (1959), criticizing Lindahl's analysis of the equilibrating process, argued that in "the case of two tax-payers only, we must have a solution analogous to the Cournot view of duopoly pricing" and, therefore, "following the Cournot case, we suppose that A and B both disregard the effect of their votes upon the other's cost share." On this model he concludes that, "given the assumption that both disregard the effects of their bidding on price, there is nothing in the mechanism of adjustment that makes for a change in cost shares." He indicates in his figure 4-2 that, if an arbitrary cost-distribution ratio is given initially, the equilibrium output of a public good will be established at the lower of the two levels of output, one of which is desired by one party and the other by the other at that given price or cost-distribution ratio (Musgrave 1959, p. 79). 16 In his penetrating review of Lindahl's theory, Head (1964) seemed to have embraced this tautology of Lindahl rather uncritically when he declared, "The crucial role of Lindahl's assumption of 'equal power' in the very special and precise sense of 'ability to exchange up to saturation, given the budget restraint of an initial endowment of factors' should now be quite clear; without it, there can be no guarantee that the fiscal optimum will in fact be achieved and equilibrium established at P" (p. 447).
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Two points may be noted. First, this interpretation by Musgrave of Lindahl's model seems to be a little less sophisticated than the model that I think Lindahl was actually describing in his analysis. Lindahl's own description of the equilibrating process appears to be more in line with von Stackelberg's "leadership and followership" approach, as already discussed above in detail. Second, even if Musgrave's interpretation is correct, his analysis of the process leading to a unique output "agreed upon by both A and B" is not entirely convincing. Our contention can be illustrated in figure 5. Let a ray extended from D passing through U be assumed to represent the arbitrary rate of cost shares set initially-or NJ/TJ in Musgrave's figure 4-2.17 His arbitrary starting point J is then given as a point located anywhere between D and T on the ray, denoted also as J in our figure 5. Clearly, when the tax-bill share ratio is as represented by the ray DU, party B (Musgrave's A) will vote to expand the public-good output (X.) to the level that corresponds to point T (Musgrave's OQ), where one of its indifference curves is tangent to the tax-share ray (the pseudo offer curve DSb intersects ray DU at T) and party A (Musgrave's B) will vote for the level represented by U (Musgrave's OC), where one of party A's indifference curves is tangent to the same ray (the pseudo offer curve DRa intersects ray MU at U).
Musgrave then proceeds to argue that at the output represented by U, party B will be prepared to contribute only its share represented by the ray DM, M being the point where the vertical line containing U intersects B's pseudo offer curve DSb. But at this tax-share ratio, party A will not agree to the output of X. indicated by U (since party A's pseudo offer curve intersects ray DMI at the output much smaller than U). Musgrave then argues that party A "will vote for a smaller supply, and adjustment continues until output OQ [represented by T in our Having come to this stage, it is not difficult to see that a variety of other behavioral assumptions can be introduced into the analysis. One such assumption, which has attained some popularity of late, is that negotiation on the distribution of costs of public expenditure is made by offers and counteroffers in terms of absolute contributions that each party makes (and not in terms of cost-share ratios). This assumption 21 Johansen (1963) was the first person ever to specify diagrammatically a part (but not the whole, although he explicitly suggested the possibility of extending his diagram to include the whole) of the contract curve, and his sOCeess was followed by Campa (1967) . But both failed to uncover and delimit the trading area; the tasks apparently have been left to the present paper. Dolbear's contribution (1967), although his was in the context of external diseconomy, should be noted, however. Pareto-preferred solutions of that temporary equilibrium solution (the shaded area of fig. 6 ). But to ascertain the location of the final solution, the information at our disposal is again not sufficient.
III. The Case of Increasing Marginal Costs
Our analysis has proceeded so far on the assumption that factor intensities in production of X-'s and X. are equal. The assumption is now dropped in order to analyze income-redistribution effects consequent upon the production of public goods. When factor intensities differ between Xi 's and X.n, the productionpossibility curve exhibits concavity from below to reflect the usual assumption of increasing relative marginal costs as shown in figure 7. Using the same technique explained in Section I, we can generate party B's map of adjusted indifference curves from figure 2 for this case in which the rotated axis has the shape of the inverted productionpossibility curve, and when it is combined with figure 1, they produce If, however, our rather artificial assumption on the distribution of ownership of factors of production is dropped, wve must allow for changes in the distribution of income accompanied by changes in relative factor earnings as product mix changes. The party whose members own relatively more of the factor used intensively in producing the public good will increase its income as a result of an increase in production of the public good, and the party whose members own relatively less of that factor will suffer a loss of income. The net change in a party's welfare resulting from a change in the output of the public good is, therefore, divided into two main parts: the one which is due to a change in the income distribution, which may be called the income-redistribution effect, and the other, due to change in the consumption opportunity of the public goods, which may be called the exchange-opportunity effect, which, in turn, is as usually divided into the income effect and the substitution effect. In this case, the contract curve will remain unchanged, but the determination of the trading area is a little more complicated because independently attainable consumption frontiers will shift as the product mix changes.
Let us assume that the members of party A as a whole own relatively less of the factors used intensively in producing the public good and the members of party B as a whole own relatively more of such factors; and, as a result, as the output of the public good (Xn) expands, the share of party A in the economy's total income declines. This is shown in figure  8 opportunities attainable independently when XX outputs are AG2, AG3, A1G4, ... .,are represented by K2, K3, K4, . .., respectively, and the locus of these points, DF, is party B's independently attainable consumptionpossibility frontier.24 If factor-intensity reversals in production take place, these frontiers will "fluctuate." Nevertheless, for simplicity, in the following wie assume throughout that the two frontiers are monotonically changing, negatively sloped, and concave from below. By finding party A's (B's) indifference curve tangential to its independently attainable consumption-possibility frontier (permitting a corner solution), wve name it N Y' (SZ'), which is obviously the highest possible welfare level that party A (B) can attain independently from the whole possible range of output mixes. Clearly, in the situation as described in figure 8, to reach an indifference curve higher than N P or SZ', each party must share the tax bill with the other; thus the area demarcated by these two indifference curves is the trading area.
In the variable marginal cost case, however, under some circumstances the area thus delimited may be a null set. In other words, there may be no trading area which is a proper subset of the area of Pareto-preferred solutions of the initial position, represented by point D. Namely, depending upon the given state of distribution of ownership of factors of production and the given technological condition, the income-redistribution effect may become so unfavorable to one party that, even if the other party bears the entire tax bill, production of a public good will place the unfavorably affected party on an indifference curve lower than its original one. This case is illustrated in figure 9 where 
